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Introduction
Insights regarding the procurement of complex performance (PCP) have only just begun to emerge Howard, 2010, Lewis and . To date the majority of studies have focused on arguments about the inter-organizational governance 'ingredients' associated with coordinating the combined effects of product-service bundles necessitating high levels of provider knowledge and/or customer interaction and "bespoke or highly customized" infrastructure (Brady et al., 2005) . In the PCP sub-field, complexity has typically been defined by taking into consideration a number of factors including the extent to which infrastructural components of the whole system are 'bespoke or highly customized', the number of project stakeholders and the length of planning/contracting negotiation and construction phases (Lewis and Roehrich (2009) . These initial studies are limited in two important dimensions. First, they adopt a relatively narrow conceptualization of complexity 1 ;
relationship performance over extended periods of time? Given the empirical focus of the work, the paper also contributes to an emerging literature on the nature of public-private interactions over extended time-periods (Mahoney et al., 2009 ). The findings illustrate that contemporary forms of contracting bring together explicit and legally enforceable terms as well as implicit, socially embedded and legally unenforceable clauses. Additionally, findings
show the importance of building up inter-personal and inter-organizational trust to establish feedback channels and increase team familiarity leading to increased performance outcomes.
This research illustrates that organizations should manage systemic complexity through multiple governance mechanisms as this study showed the limits of both contractual and relational governance mechanisms when used individually.
The paper has six sections. Following the introduction, section 2 introduces the core notions of complexity and exchange governance. Section 3 discusses the methodological considerations for the multiple case study approach. A description of the case study context and findings are presented in section 4. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the findings in the light of the conceptual background and conclude by formulating implications for managers, policy makers and outlining future research.
Conceptual Background

Complexity and Organizations
Despite the relatively recent interest of management scholars in the study of complex systems (e.g. McKelvey, 1999; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) , complexity as a sub-field in the social sciences has existed for many decades 2 . From the general (von Bertalanffy, 1968) and open systems models (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972) , that arguably laid the foundations for modern organization theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967) , via system dynamics (Forrester, 1961) , complex adaptive systems (Holland, 1975) , and deterministic chaos theory (May, 1976) . Most management authors employ a "structural" view of complexity, taking into consideration the number of complicated interrelationships and institutional structures (Pryor, 1995; Stodder, 1995) in an organizing system. Remington and Pollack (2007) , for example, emphasize the challenge of dealing with the non-linear, emergent behavior that can occur from interactions between many interconnected tasks. More pragmatically, Williams 2 Of course, complexity is a hugely multidisciplinary concept, having been previously explored in a variety of disciplines including mathematics, physics, economics and biology (e.g. Lewin, 1992; Waldrop, 1992) . (2002) suggests that structural complexity creates: (i) multiple objectives with conflicting goals, and (ii) a multiplicity of stakeholders. Similarly, complex product systems (CoPS) research has highlighted how ever greater demands on performance, capacity and reliability result in system complexity increasing across generations (Davies, 2004) . In seeking to extract meaningful prescription from complexity theory, many authors have effectively (if rarely explicitly) revisited Ashby's law of requisite variety: "if a system is to be stable, the number of states of its control mechanism must be greater than or equal to the number of states in the system being controlled" (Ashby, 1956) . In other words, proponents of complexity theory conclude that organizations should not try to reduce complexity, but rather respond via more complex strategies, structures, and decision processes (Boisot and Child, 1999; Eisenhardt et al., 2000) .
In the PCP sub-field complexity has typically been defined, using the CoPS logic, as the extent to which infrastructural components of the whole system are 'bespoke or highly customized' (Brady et al., 2005) and service performance is a function of characteristics such as the number of project stakeholders and the length of planning/contracting negotiation and construction phases (Lewis and Roehrich (2009) . Interestingly, even for PCP studies the predominant unit of analysis has been complexity at the level of the project, product-service and organization, whereas this study seeks to investigate complexity using an intra-and interorganizational level of analysis. For this application, it is interesting to again revisit Ashby's work because he adopted the relatively unusual approach of not 'building' complexity by assembling components, but rather looking for the constraints that reduce the potential variety to that observed.
Complexity and Exchange Governance
The extant purchasing and supply management literature offers limited insights into the impact of complexity on exchange governance (Williams, 1999) . There has been much debate about the key ingredients of exchange governance with an increasing number of studies investigating, for example, whether contractual and relational governance function as substitutes or complements (e.g. Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Zheng et al., 2008) . Likewise, with specific reference to relational governance components of the exchange 'mix', studies have distinguished between various forms of trust, such as intentional and competence trust (e.g.
Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005) . The following section explains contractual and relational complexity as two important concepts in long-term exchange relationships.
Contractual Complexity
Contractual governance refers to "explicit, formal and usually written contracts" (Vandaele et al., 2007, p.240) , representing detailed, binding legal agreements that specify the obligations and roles of both parties in a relationship (Lyons and Mehta, 1997) . Contractual safeguards are established to minimize cost and performance losses from relationship hazards (Joskow, 1988) . Scholars have argued that more complex relationships (determined by, for instance, asset specificity and contract duration) result in parties aiming to write more complex contracts in order to foresee every possible future contingency (Klein et al., 1978) . Similarly, as investments become more specific to the buyer-supplier relationship, Williamson (1983) anticipated that cost-minimizing institutional choice will respond by moving from simple anonymous (spot) market contracting (classical contract law), to more complex long-term contractual arrangements with protective provisions (neoclassical contract law).
Consider the particular example of contracting for public-private partnerships 3 (PPPs). Prior studies have observed and argued for more complex contracts (e.g. Leiringer, 2006; Iossa et al., 2007) to govern these classic PCP-type arrangements. Yet, governance through formal contracts depends on the programmability of tasks and behaviors and the measurability of outcomes ex-ante (Das and Teng, 2001 ). Thus, the transaction process and outcome between two contracting organizations needs to be predictable and codifiable (Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa, 2005) . Even in relatively simple exchange arrangements it is rarely possible to draft complete contracts (i.e. given the presence of asymmetric information, time and cost constraints, etc.) and, correspondingly, the notion of 'completeness' is particularly problematic in PCP (Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa, 2005) where there is a very large number of technological and transactional variables, all multiplied by the uncertainties introduced by extended timeframes (Lewis and Roehrich, 2009 ). Equally, formal contracts require monitoring to determine actors' behavior with regards to the rules set out in the contract.
Here again, monitoring a complex system may be impractical and/or uneconomic. In sum, although contractual governance complexity (e.g. the number of safeguards and contingencies specified in the contract and the contract length in pages : Joskow, 1988; Egglestone et al., 2000) is often observed in PCP arrangements, it may not deliver meaningful enforcement and control.
Relational Complexity
Relational governance emerges from the values and agreed-upon processes in the exchange relationship (Macneil, 1980) and incorporates: trust and commitment (Lui and Ngo, 2004) , relational capital (Kale et al., 2002) , information sharing routines (Poppo et al., 2008) , and informal exchange (Cook and Emerson, 1978) . Unforeseeable relationship contingencies are safeguarded by flexibility, which allows for a bilateral approach to problem solving, solidarity and information sharing. Moreover, partnering organizations' expectations of relationship continuity and longevity that accompany relational governance generate incentives to make exchange-specific investments (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) . Trust is considered to be an important element of relational governance, resulting in decreased relational risk (Granovetter, 1973; Dyer and Oh, 1988) . Following Poppo and Zenger (2002) , relational governance complexity is an emergent function of characteristics such as the extent of trust on an inter-personal and inter-organizational level and the extent of information sharing routines and communication channels. Increasingly dense and extended patterns of reciprocal interdependence and increasingly frequent interactions across all types of preestablished intra-and inter-organizational boundaries (Scharpf 1994 ) all contribute to increased relational governance complexity. In PCP arrangements, relational governance often begins without previous exchange experience (i.e. they are novel, one-off contracts) and can be harder to maintain as the scale and scope of exchange increases, because repeated business is less likely and, for example in PPP arrangements, there is unlikely to be cultural homogeneity 4 (North, 1990) . In sum, although relational governance complexity may be crucial to effective PCP governance, the creation, maintenance, and enrichment of relational governance (e.g. networks of social ties) will be time and resource consuming (Larson, 1992) . Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among the key concepts under investigation. Figure 1 'Conceptual framework' about here
Please insert
Research Methodology
The research uses an abductive multiple case study method (Stake, 1995; Dubois and Gadde, 2002 ) and adopts Van de Ven's (2007) approach for studying processes unfolding over time.
To some extent the empirical fieldwork parallels the theoretical conceptualizations in this research study. The abductive approach presents a more accurate picture of the cumulative research process that is interwoven with the development of concepts and empirical findings of this research. The logic of abduction is that the research process commutes between theories and practice as an interweaving dialogue between theory and empirical findings.
The process-based case study approach aims to identify explanations of complex phenomena that have evolved over time and which have received limited prior investigation (Yin, 2003; Suddaby, 2006) . These phenomena are investigated in their natural context, generating rich datasets which are particularly important for the measurement of complex and intangible phenomena. Two UK Public Private Partnership projects were investigated across two different sectors: healthcare and waste management. PPPs are types of long-term interorganizational relationships which bring together public and private organizations for the design, build, operate, and finance elements. A common characteristic of PPP projects is that they are concerned with core public services which are often politically sensitive such as healthcare and education (Grout, 1997) .
Overall, 43 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with different key stakeholders lasting between one to two hours were conducted over a period of three years. Interviews for each case were conducted with, for example, project managers, facilities managers and project directors from the private and public sector organizations forming the dyadic relationship (Appendix A). The research acknowledged the complex network associated with PPP projects, thus data collection moved beyond the dyadic relationship. Additional interviews were conducted with key stakeholders such as sub-contractors and relevant government departments. Interviewees can be categorized into three groups: first, individuals from multiple levels of the organizational hierarchy such as middle managers, directors and exCEOs; second, individuals from different functional areas such as operational and strategic management and third, individuals present at different points in the relationship's history in order to extract insights and to understand how the relationship has evolved. At each interview, two researchers were present to take additional notes which were later compared and typed up (Yin, 2003) . Interviews were taped and transcribed, whilst the confidentiality of participating organizations and individuals was assured. Interview data reliability was further strengthened through triangulation of data sources including secondary sources such as company documentation and reports from HM Treasury and the Audit Commission. In order to address construct validity, this study deployed different remedies: using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain of events, and having key informants review individual case reports (Yin, 2003; Gibbert et al., 2008) . Discrepancies between different informants were addressed by triangulating primary interview data with secondary data sources from company and government reports. In addition, draft case reports were sent to key informants to clarify and address any occurring discrepancies. Table 1 summarizes the different tactics and their operationalization within our study. In conclusion, the different tactics employed within the study were primarily concerned with establishing consistency and visibility throughout the data collection and analysis phases. Consequently, the application of different tactics ensured valid and reliable conclusions, thus strengthening the research credibility of our work.
Please insert Table 1 'Summary of research credibility' about here
Case analysis
The software package NVivo was used to support the analysis of interview transcripts. Both authors were involved in the extensive coding and data analysis processes. Specific coding included contextual variables and the level of significance attached to the use of relational and contractual governance. Measuring contractual governance complexity was based on indications of documentary changes or explicit referral events, (e.g. third party legal support).
Measurements for concepts such as performance were triangulated using primary interview data and secondary data such as company and government reports. Overall performance was measured by taking into consideration the following dimensions: (i) interviewees' perception of performance outcomes measured on a 5-point Likert scale; (ii) primary and secondary data regarding the design phase and construction phase completion on time; (iii) primary and secondary data on design phase and construction phase completion on budget; and (iv) primary and secondary data on design phase and construction phase completion and operations phase service delivery to quality standards as set out in the contract. A wealth of secondary data is publically available because of the nature of public-private relationships delivering PCP arrangements which are constantly under public scrutiny.
Case Selection
Embarking on an empirical study designed to answer the research question required us to make ex-ante judgments of systemic and governance complexity; in effect adopting a probabilistic view of complexity. Systemic complexity offers a more encompassing measurement and reflects a combination of previous complexity measurements (adopted from system complexity - Simon, 1962; Hobday, 2000) . Systemic complexity was assessed as a function of (a) the number of project stakeholders, (b) the length of planning/contracting negotiation and construction phases, and (c) the degree of substantially bespoke or highly customized hardware and software elements. Our case selection was informed by considerations that Public Private Partnerships are archetypes PCP-type arrangements, considering the myriad of stakeholders, the extended periods of contract negotiation, design and construction of public sector infrastructure and services, and the high degree of highly customized elements (e.g. Caldwell et al., 2009; Caldwell and Howard, 2010 ).
The positioning is relative to each other and not absolute. That means, while the healthcare project has been positioned as more complex than the waste management case, the healthcare case would be seen as less complex when compared to, for instance, airborne surveillance and counter-measure aircraft Nimrod/MRA4 or Heathrow Terminal 5. There were also differences in terms of project performance outcomes. Figure 2 summarizes the differences across both investigated cases. Governance complexity was measured in two parts. We followed previous work in using the length of the contract (in pages) and its number of contingencies as an indicator of contractual complexity (Joskow, 1988; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) . Finally, relational complexity was measured, following the study by Zaheer et al. (1998) , via a proxy measure rating the significance of inter-personal and inter-organizational relationships as indicated by buyer and supplier interviewees.
Please insert Figure 2 'Systemic complexity and performance outcomes across cases' about here
Case findings
This section reports on the case findings of two investigated cases across different sectors. 
Contractual Complexity
The systemic complexity of the project had a direct impact on contractual governance. From the outset of the negotiations for the project, the strategy of both parties " […] ." This problem was typical of the various problems encountered when implementing and operationalizing the bespoke contract in the day-to-day operations.
Relational Complexity
Having gone through a lengthy bidding and contract negotiation phase, both parties encouraged the establishment of inter-personal relationships during the build phase by co- 
Waste Management Case
Systemic Complexity
A UK Local Government organization was faced with a deteriorating solid waste management situation, a rapidly diminishing landfill capacity and the prospect of waste management case exhibited fewer bespoke and customized design elements. However, the lack of relevant experience and appropriate data to design service delivery still resulted in long contract negotiation and design phases. The council's Project Manager explained that
"[…] it was all about the output specification […] getting it right and considering all the constraints […] we spent a lot of time with legal people in the room […]." Contractual Complexity
From the outset, the contract was perceived by both organizations as playing a central role in minimizing risks and consequently achieving desired project outcomes. Thus, a complex contract was drafted to govern the long-term relationship. The contract covered a variety of possible future contingencies and included legal safeguards in areas related to performance measures, payment mechanisms and dispute resolution and termination procedures. Despite the time spent negotiating and drafting a 'complete' contract, interviewees from both organizations later reported that during subsequent project phases the contract appeared to be incomplete, leading to a great many post-contractual variations. For instance, the council's 
[…] we jointly decided to write a working agreement which contains the most important terms and which is very helpful on a day-to-day basis […]" (Project Manager, public partner).
Relational Complexity
While contractual governance mechanisms prescribed formal meetings, informal meetings such as after-work activities or away-days were frequently deployed in early project phases.
The development of an early trusting relationship was based primarily on inter-personal relationships between boundary spanners from both organizations. sharing, the outcome of the negotiating phase was a very detailed contract. Interviewees in this case stressed the point that their successful experience in the earlier project phases made them confident that they could jointly achieve a successful project.
Building up such inter-personal relationships was consistently described as a slow, timeconsuming process that needs commitment and consistency across team members. The erosion of inter-personal relationships occurs quickly once a team member left and the
boundary-spanning relationship was not maintained by new or existing team members. "The private partner's personnel kept changing quite often and it is very difficult to build up any personal relationships with them. […] So it is a constant process of building relationships
over and over again" (Project Manager, Public Partner).
Discussion
Complex Systems and Complex Contracts?
In both PCP cases, when faced with systemic complexity, the interacting organizations placed high emphasis on the formation of complex contracts, including, for instance, numerous clauses to penalize non-compliance with stipulated terms. Indeed it can be argued that contracts were seen as the key mechanism for protecting the relationship against opportunistic behavior by the partnering organization. Moreover, this emphasis continued throughout the The analysis also illustrated the significant difficulties associated with actually employing a complex contract comprised of hundreds of schedules and procedures. To counteract the problems of complex contracts a shortened working agreement for use in day-to-day operations was produced in the Waste Management case. This working agreement contained extracts of contract clauses, procedures and guidelines that proved helpful on a day-to-day basis in the better performing case. Complex, formal contracts in this case were only deployed to resolve relationship issues exceeding the realm of the working agreement or when extensive relationship changes needed to be reflected in the formal, legally binding complex contract.
Complex Contracts and Complex Relationships?
The explicit contribution of complex contracts to relational governance was limited to rigid frameworks for formal meetings among senior personnel or for formal information sharing across the various stakeholders. Indeed the findings revealed very limited evidence of organizationally sanctioned socialization mechanisms, such as joint workshops. More negatively, in these PPP examples, exogenous uncertainties such as European and UK procurement laws, which include extensive regulatory frameworks, were perceived to leave little scope to apply a more relational contracting approach based on: common goals, agreed risk-sharing, and open communication. This suggests, in contrast with contractual complexity constructed between exchange partners, externally imposed (e.g. regulatory) frameworks, as found in both investigated cases, can serve to hinder the development of inter-organizational
So what is the purpose of the complex contract and what explains its (apparently ineffectual)
persistence? In contrast to the assertion that incomplete contracts may lead to relationship ambiguity (Goldberg, 1976) , these exploratory findings may suggest that attempting to resolve contractual incompleteness actually provided the basis for fostering interorganizational relationships (e.g. facilitating bilateral approaches to problem solving). In the waste management case, complex contracts were considered as a commitment to the longterm relationship and a "safety net", rather than a practical systemic governance mechanism.
In other words, perhaps the contract provided an ongoing formal mechanism for both parties to observe and test each other's goodwill over time, sequentially and gradually. This appears to echo Ring and Van de Ven's (1994) findings that the development of trust is a cyclical process of recurrent bargaining, commitment, and execution of events among both partners.
Returning to Ashby's terms, the findings could suggest that it was actually the growing complexity of relational governance (e.g. in the form of boundary-spanning individuals, working agreements) that provided the requisite number of control states.
Complex Systems and Complex Relationships?
Although these observations clearly reinforce the notion that contractual and relational exchange governance act in combination (cf. Zheng et al., 2008) and, moreover, it can be argued that the development of relationships in complex supply arrangements is substantially influenced by the process of complex contractual governance, there were clearly distinct aspects of the evolving complexity of relational governance.
Establishing inter-personal relationships across partnering organizations to overcome difficulties in the early more vulnerable project phases yielded positive relationship effects as evident in the early waste management case. However, given the systemic complexity of PCP arrangements, limited evidence of inter-personal trust was detected in the hospital case.
Partnering organizations in this case experienced negative effects from the long-term contract negotiation process, which resulted in distrusting behavior among the contracting parties. The relationship in this case was typified by an aggressive contract approach and mutual blaming behavior. In contrast, when boundary-spanning individuals develop strong inter-personal relationships, this promotes norms of: flexibility, solidarity and reciprocity.
Empirical evidence shows that building up inter-personal relationships at the outset of the project led to higher levels of flexibility in contract interpretation during later project stages.
In such situations, contractual governance mainly functions as a 'framing device' to resolve operational problems, the use of relational governance can add the necessary flexibility to resolve operational problems. The formation of boundary-spanning relationships is also linked to opportunities for demonstrating and judging trustworthiness. Boundary-spanning individuals were able to immerse themselves in the partnering organization's culture and environment, thus leading to a better understanding of the counterpart's objectives and goals.
Findings also suggest that inter-personal trust based on the relationship of boundary-spanning individuals can easily erode once an individual leaves the project. In such circumstances, rebuilding these forms of relationships is a gradual process that takes time. In contrast, interorganizational trust diminishes gradually step by step as it does not, in comparison to interpersonal trust, rely on individuals, but rather on teams and established organizational frameworks. To maintain inter-personal relationships among contracting parties' personnel, inter-personal trust that develops should be translated into inter-organizational trust by establishing organizational procedures, such as team meetings and information exchange.
Conclusions and Implications
This empirical study provides additional contributions to theoretical and pragmatic understanding of this increasingly significant phenomenon of PCP by investigating the notion of complexity in greater depth, with a specific focus on the relationship between systemic and exchange governance complexity. More specifically, the work explored Ashby's (1956) assertion that if a system was to be stable, the number of states of its control mechanism must be greater than or equal to the number of states in the system being controlled. Before outlining the key conclusions from the work, it is important to reflect on some of its limitations. This was an exploratory study and although established literature was used to frame the investigations, there was no formal hypothesis development or testing. This arrangements and create instead a rule based system. Building up inter-personal relationships during early relationship stages proved useful throughout later stages. Second, the cases show that inter-personal relationships are crucial to establish feedback channels and increase team familiarity leading to increased performance outcomes. Given the high staff turnover, interpersonal trust needs to be translated into inter-organizational frameworks to promote the formation of inter-organizational routines and channels for information sharing over time.
Third, while the majority of organizations in PCP arrangements respond to systemic complexity with ever increasing contractual governance complexity, organizations in the better performing case illustrate that an increase in relational exchange governance should complement contractual exchange governance in PCP arrangements. For instance, findings
show that inter-personal relationships facilitated the formation of working agreements. Rather than counteracting systemic complexity merely with increased contractual complexity, the better performing case also deployed a combination of working agreements and interpersonal relationships. Thus, contractual and relational exchange governance mechanisms act as the PCP variety reducing constraints. This study showed the limits of both contractual and relational governance mechanisms when used individually, hence organizations should manage systemic complexity through multiple governance mechanisms which evolve over time.
Managerial and policy implications
The study's results have several implications in terms of organizations and governments charged with procuring and managing complex performance arrangements. Findings show that organizations in PCP arrangements respond to systemic complexity by increasing exchange governance complexity, leading to complex and unmanageable contracts. To complement complex contracts, relational exchange governance, in forms of interorganizational and inter-personal relationships, should be deployed to achieve better relationship performance. Contracting capabilities should be combined with relational governance activities, facilitating the formation of inter-personal trust through boundaryspanning relationships. These may lead to increased information sharing and joint problem solving. However, the level of positive performance implications generated from developing inter-personal trust depends also on translating these relationships into inter-organizational frameworks. Public-private relationships, spanning 30 years or more, are increasingly playing a central role in delivering PCP-type arrangements. Governments entering into PCP arrangements need to consider the importance of relational governance in combination with contractual governance to balance risk sharing and to achieve high performance. The study shows that counteracting complexity with ever increasing degrees of contractual governance complexity does not necessarily lead to better performance and may even prove to be counterproductive as resources should rather focus on building up trusting relationships.
Rather than seeking to contractually stipulate every possible future contingency, early relationship stages should be focused on building up inter-personal and inter-organizational trust as evidenced in the better performing case. Fostering a higher degree of interaction amongst partnering organizations in PCP arrangements is vital to realize long-term benefits.
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